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Abstract
This study evaluates the viability of a threat assessment model developed
to calculate the risk of targeted violence as a predictor of violence by
potential lone terrorists. There is no profile, to date, which would assist
in the identification of a lone terrorist prior to an attack. The threat
assessment model developed by Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, and Berglund
and described in “Threat Assessment: Defining an approach for
evaluating risk of targeted violence” (1999) poses ten questions about
the patterns of thinking and behaviors that may precipitate an attack of
targeted violence.
Three terrorists are studied to assess the model’s value as a predictor of
terrorism. It is assessed for its use within law enforcement, during an
investigation of someone brought to attention as a possible terrorist and
for family members or friends who suspect potential terrorist behavior.
Would these questions encourage someone to report a friend to prevent a
possible attack?
This threat assessment model provides a foundation for future research
focused on developing a structured risk assessment for lone terrorists. In
its present form, the questions can assist both citizens and law
enforcement personnel in identifying the patterns of thought and
behavior potentially indicative of a lone terrorist.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss3/4
48 
 
Introduction 
Terrorists who operate without the support of a terrorist organization, network, 
or other individuals can be difficult to detect before an attack.
1
 Research into 
terrorism is predominantly focused on organizations and the concepts of social 
psychology that explain the influence of groups on the recruit. Research on lone 
offender terrorism has been minimal, seemingly because terrorism is most often 
regarded as a collective activity.
2
 From the perspective of social psychology, it is 
relatively easy to understand how a disenfranchised individual can be drawn into 
a terrorist group. With a rise in individual attacks since 9/11, it may be important 
to research other forms of terrorism.  
 
Although, to date, there is no profile that would predict a terrorist attack by a 
lone offender, it may be possible to recognize the behaviors that could lead to an 
attack by a lone terrorist by applying the threat assessment approach conceived 
of by Fein and Vossekuil and refined by Borum, Fein, Vossekuil and Berglund in 
their work “Threat assessment: Defining an approach for evaluating risk of 
targeted violence.”3 Their model examines behaviors that may help to identify 
lone offender terrorists before they attack. The threat assessment approach 
developed by Borum et al. will be evaluated for its effectiveness as a tool to aid in 
the identification of lone terrorist offenders. This approach has been applied to 
other types of targeted violence in cases of school homicide, domestic violence, 
stalking and workplace violence, but has not been considered for the lone 
terrorist.4 The behaviors addressed by this tool appear to be as relevant to the 
prevention of an attack by a lone terrorist as they are for the perpetrator of other 
targeted violence. 
 
Leon Panetta, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), stated in 
February 2010, “It’s the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay attention to 
as the main threat to this country.”5 Anders Breivik killed seventy-seven people in 
Norway when he detonated a car bomb in Oslo and then attacked a youth camp. 
In his manifesto he described how “Solo Martyr Cells” are undetectable and that 
the cell commander works solo, basing all decisions on fixed fundamental 
principles, eliminating the need to ever consult. Breivik advises his reader against 
                                                        
1 Ramon Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, (2010): 854, available at: 
https://www.opensource.gov/providers/ebsco/GoToSite/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&hid=1
3&sid=db676d04-b927-4b4f-b208-7975acbe1e19%40sessionmgr10.    
2 Ibid, 855. 
3 Randy Borum, Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil and John Berglund, “Threat Assessment: Defining an 
Approach for Evaluating Risk of Targeted Violence,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law Volume 17 
(1999): 323-337. 
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Protective 
Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement 
Officials, by Robert Fein and Bryan Vossekuil (NIJ/OJP/DOJ Publication No. NCJ 179981 (2000): 
iv.  
5 Pantucci, Raffaello, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists 
(London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011): 3, 
available at: http://icsr.info/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf. 
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making any connection with extremist networks or other movements to minimize 
detection, and remain hidden until ready to act.6 
 
The key to a counterterrorism response is to know how attacks are formulated, 
and not necessarily who will conduct an attack. Insight into the pathway to 
violence might yield a more effective way to defend against the lone offender and 
prevent a terrorist attack. Counterterrorism services must be vigilant for the 
signals, no matter how small, that an individual displays before an attack.7 
 
This study examines behaviors that may identify lone offender terrorists before 
they attack by analyzing the threat assessment model developed by Borum et al.8 
The model will be assessed against the case studies of three domestic lone 
terrorists. The model will be analyzed for its value to law enforcement 
professionals in the assessment of a potential terrorist. The identification of an 
individual who poses a threat cannot and should not fall solely within the realm 
of law enforcement. Discussion will also include the value of this model for use by 
the general public in order to recognize behaviors and thought processes that 
might identify the possible lone offender before they engage in terrorist attacks. 
Are the behaviors of a terrorist similar enough to those of other types of lone 
offenders? Can this model be used to help identify a potential lone terrorist, 
encouraging the average citizen to contact law enforcement personnel? Does this 
model serve as a basis for an investigation? 
 
Bruce Hoffman’s definition of terrorism will be used as a baseline: 
 
“…the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat 
of violence in the pursuit of political change…is specifically designed to have far-
reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the 
terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 
‘target audience’ Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek 
to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political 
change on either a local or an international scale.”
9
  
 
The Lone Terrorist 
Spaaij’s definition of a lone offender terrorist consists of three elements: the 
terrorist operates alone, does not belong to an organized terrorist group or 
network, and the plan is conceived and conducted solely by the individual with no 
direct outside guidance or command. The ideology behind a terrorist group and 
an individual engaged in terrorism may be the same, a lone offender may 
sympathize with the ideology of a terrorist group and may have once belonged to 
                                                        
6 Anders Breivik, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence,” unitednations.ispnw.org, 2011: 
820,  available at: http://unitednations.ispnw.org/archives/breivik-manifesto-2011.pdf 
 
7 Edwin Baaker and Beatrice de Graf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches 
Addressed,” Perspectives on Terrorism (December 2011), 47, 6, available at:  
https://www.opensource.gov/providers/ebsco/GoToSite/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&hid
=12&sid=3b822882-09a2-41f8-9ac0-7ce7d00e7f51%40sessionmgr11. 
8 Borum et al., “Threat Assessment,” 323-337.  
9 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40-41. 
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and/or been trained by a group, but the attack was neither directed nor 
supported by any organization.
10
 
 
A typical terrorist has contact with others of similar interests, often goes abroad 
for training, and likely purchases a weapon for the purpose of the attack. While 
any of these tasks could raise a flag for security personnel, and signal a potential 
terrorist plot, the lone terrorist is unlikely to be involved in any of those activities 
and would likely go unnoticed until an attack.
11
 One of the more difficult 
terrorists to detect is one who seeks information online and passively absorbs the 
message without interacting on the website.
12
 The Internet is rife with extremist 
material that appears to have fostered the growth of the self-taught extremist. It 
may be difficult to distinguish between an individual who simply adopts the 
ideology of a terrorist group and the angry loner who acts out using information 
obtained from the Internet to pretend to be part of a larger movement.
13
 Pantucci 
suggests there is more mental illness among individual attackers than is found 
within a terrorist group. Psychological issues could easily prohibit one from 
joining a group, forcing a mentally ill individual to act out alone.
14
  
 
On the Internet, loners could easily connect with radicals on another continent, 
drawing inspiration and guidance, without direct contact. Not only is the Internet 
a medium for ideology, it provides information on how to build devices or 
otherwise inflict harm in the name of an ideology.
15
 The lone offender may share 
some level of commitment to, and identify with, an extremist movement.
16
 Those 
who can act without leadership or a support network and adhere to the ideology 
can be very dangerous and would be difficult to locate, track, and monitor.
17
 A 
major challenge for law enforcement is determining how an individual moves 
from having radical beliefs to actually acting on those beliefs.
18
  
 
Lone attackers are more difficult to monitor because they are not tied to an 
organization already under surveillance. They have operated with little expense 
and much success.
19
 Some prominent examples include Theodore Kaczynski and 
Eric Rudolph who were both very effective in evading capture for years and 
spreading fear among ordinary citizens. They had very strong beliefs and had 
separated themselves from family and community.  
 
 
                                                        
10 Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 856. 
11 Pantucci, “A Typology of Lone Wolves,” 6. 
12 Paul Cruikshank and Tim Lister, “The ‘Lone Wolf’ –the Unknowable Face of Terror” CNN.com, 
February 8, 2012, available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-18/opinion/opinion_lone-wolf-
terror_1_lone-wolf-terror-attack-lone-terrorists?_s=PM:OPINION. 
13 Pantucci, “A Typology of Lone Wolves,” 6. 
14 Ibid, 5. 
15 Ibid, 6-7. 
16 Baaker and de Graf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 47. 
17 Marie-Helen Maras, “How to Catch a Terrorist: Is Mass Surveillance the Answer?” Journal of 
Applied Security Research  (2010):26-28, available at:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361610903411790 
18 Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism,” 3.  
19 George Michael, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 2012), 3, available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/99610155/Lone-Wolf-Terror-
and-the-Rise-of-Leaderless-Resistance. 
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Counterterrorism and the Lone Offender 
Because one cannot predict the nature or the probability of an attack nor the 
target, U.S. counterterrorism policy has shifted to a precautionary approach. 
Policies designed to deter terrorism are not likely to be entirely effective because 
laws that prevent crime, to be effective, require an offender to process the cost of 
committing a crime versus the benefit and then make a series of rational 
decisions before making a choice. Many terrorists do not appear affected by the 
threat of imprisonment or death, as many are willing to die for their cause.
20
  
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the authority to investigate 
individuals or groups based upon information that identifies terrorist threats or 
activity before an attack occurs. This gives the FBI the opportunity to make 
assessments of activity before a crime is committed. An example is the ability to 
monitor Internet websites and social media, where terrorists are known to 
recruit, train and communicate.
21
 Undercover agents, informants, and agent 
provocateurs who have infiltrated and reported on terrorist activity have been 
effective.
22
 
 
Counterterrorism is challenging because the expression of radical ideas in an 
open forum is legal, but the planning toward a terrorist attack is often done in 
secret, as the activity is illegal.
23
  Effective intelligence is required in order to 
anticipate and prevent an attack. In the case of an organization where guidance 
comes from a leader, information may be gleaned from communication 
intercepts, from the monitoring of border crossings and the movement of money, 
as well as from relationships with foreign intelligence services. However, this 
intelligence is unavailable for the individual terrorist who does not communicate 
with nor gain support from an organization.
24
 As a result, intelligence gathered at 
the national level may not be adequate to intercept an individual operating alone. 
 
Local police can gather information from the community through police 
networking, conducting investigations or intelligence collection. The sharing of 
information between law enforcement agencies is critical to counterterrorism, 
and an active police force in a community may be able to develop relationships 
with citizens that would encourage reporting.
25
 Providing guidance for 
bystanders who may observe the activity of a potential lone terrorist may enhance 
the reporting, thus contributing to counterterrorism. 
 
Threat Assessment 
A threat assessment is defined as “…a set of investigative and operational 
activities designed to identify, assess, and manage persons who may pose a threat 
                                                        
20 Maras, “How to Catch a Terrorist,” 22-24. 
21 Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism,” 3. 
22 Maras, “How to Catch a Terrorist,” 36. 
23 Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism,” 3-4. 
24 Brian Jenkins, “The Terrorism Early Warning Group's Contribution to the Counterterrorism 
Intelligence Process,” in J. Sullivan and A. Bauer (eds.), Terrorism Early Warning: 10 Years of 
Achievement in Fighting Terrorism and Crime (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County, 2008), 215, 
available at: http://file.lacounty.gov/lasd/cms1_144939.pdf . 
25 Jenkins, “The Terrorism Early Warning Group's Contribution,” 215-218. 
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of violence to identifiable targets.”
26
 It involves the analysis of thoughts and 
behavior patterns that result in an attack on a particular target. An assessment 
must determine the level of threat posed by the individual at a given point in time 
as well as an assessment of the progress made toward an attack and the speed at 
which the individual is moving toward the goal.
27
  
 
Can a threat assessment model for other violent crimes be applied to terrorism? 
The prediction of violence is never a simple yes or no; the actions of a potential 
perpetrator are conditional, dependent upon numerous conditions or 
circumstances.
28
 The construct of dangerousness or risk has been viewed as fluid; 
dangerousness depends upon the situation, it can change, and the level of risk lies 
on a continuum of probability.
29
 Many potential factors must be evaluated in the 
development of a model to assess risk. Although the same factors may apply to 
terrorism that apply to other types of violence, their significance may be weighted 
differently when the model is validated.
30
 The ten questions developed by Borum 
et al. as an approach to evaluate the threat for targeted violence will be assessed 
for their value in evaluating the threat for lone offender terrorism.  
 
This approach to assessing the threat of targeted violence is based upon three 
principles: 1) targeted violence is the culmination of a process of thinking and 
behavior that is deliberate and not impulsive; 2) there is interaction among the 
potential attacker, a past emotional event, a current situation, and a target; and 
3) understanding the behaviors of the individual as they progress from the 
development of the idea to the actual movements toward the target.
31
 The threat 
assessment tool refined by Borum et al. poses questions that address these 
principles. It is applied retrospectively here to the cases of three lone offender 
terrorists to assess its potential value prior to the terrorist attack.  
 
The results of this analysis indicate this threat assessment tool may be useful in 
the development of a more effective counterterrorism program. An effective 
counterterrorism program should identify, monitor, and arrest the lone offender. 
Included among the keys to an effective counterterrorism program for the lone 
terrorist is to understand how attacks are formulated rather than to know who 
will attack. Counterterrorism programs should encourage community 
cooperation in identifying the lone offender and should study the potential 
triggers that radicalize the lone offender.
32
 This model contributes to this effort. 
 
Threat Assessment Process 
Borum et al. posed ten questions to guide an evaluation of a threat of directed 
violence. Table 1 presents the questions as they were initially presented in the 
Targeted Violence Questions column.
33
 They are presented beside the questions 
                                                        
26 Borum et al., “Threat Assessment,” 327. 
27 Ibid, 327-328. 
28 U.S. Department of Justice, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations 
(Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1998): 49. 
29 Borum et al., “Threat Assessment,” 324. 
30 John Monahan, “The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism,” Psychology, Public Policy and 
Law 18:2 (May 2012): 13-28. 
31 Ibid, 329-330. 
32 Baaker and de Graf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 47-48. 
33 Ibid, 331-334.  
Zierhoffer: Threat Assessment Lone Terrorists
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
53 
 
posed in this study, under Terrorism Questions, showing the changes that make 
them more relevant for terrorism. Two questions, numbers three and four, have 
been adjusted slightly for use in the case of a lone terrorist. 
 
Table 1: The Threat Assessment Process: Ten Questions Comparison 
of Questions Developed for Targeted Violence and Terrorism 
# 
TARGETED VIOLENCE 
QUESTIONS 
TERRORISM  
QUESTIONS 
1 
Motivation 
What motivated the subject to 
make the statements, or take the 
action, that caused him/her to 
come to attention? 
What motivated the subject to make 
the statements, or take the action, 
that caused him/her to come to 
attention? 
2 
Communication 
What has the subject 
communicated to anyone 
concerning his/her intentions? 
What has the subject communicated 
to anyone concerning his/her 
intentions? 
3 
Interest in 
Terrorism 
Has the subject shown an interest 
in targeted violence, perpetrators 
of targeted violence, weapons, 
extremist groups, or murder? 
Has the subject shown an interest in 
terrorism, terrorist groups, weapons, 
extremist groups, or espoused a 
radical ideology? 
4 
Attack-related 
Behaviors 
Has the subject engaged in attack-
related behavior, including any 
menacing, harassing, and/or 
stalking-type behavior? 
Has the subject engaged in attack-
related behavior, including 
surveillance, purchasing weapons or 
the ingredients for 
explosives/weapons? 
5 
Mental Illness 
Does the subject have a history of 
mental illness involving command 
hallucinations, delusional ideas, 
feelings of persecution, etc. with 
indications that the subject has 
acted on those beliefs? 
Does the subject have a 
history of mental illness 
involving command 
hallucinations, delusional 
ideas, feelings of persecution, 
etc. with indications that the 
subject has acted on those 
beliefs? 
6 
Organization 
How organized is the subject? Is 
he/she capable of developing and 
carrying out a plan? 
How organized is the subject? 
Is he/she capable of 
developing and carrying out a 
plan? 
7 
Loss 
Has the subject experienced a 
recent loss and or loss of status and 
has this led to feelings of 
desperation and despair? 
Has the subject experienced a 
recent loss and or loss of 
status and has this led to 
feelings of desperation and 
despair? 
8 
Corroboration 
Corroboration –What is the subject 
saying and is it consistent with 
his/her actions? 
Corroboration –What is the subject 
saying and is it consistent with 
his/her actions? 
9 
Concern of 
Others 
Is there concern among those that 
know the subject that he/she might 
take action based on inappropriate 
ideas? 
Is there concern among those that 
know the subject that he/she might 
take action based on inappropriate 
ideas? 
10 
Prevention 
What factors in the subject’s life 
and/or environment might 
What factors in the subject’s life 
and/or environment might 
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Case Studies  
The threat assessment model refined by Borum et al. is applied to the cases of 
three lone offender terrorists. The examination of these case studies 
demonstrates the similarities in the behaviors of terrorists to the behaviors of 
lone offenders who are not deemed to be terrorists. The answers to each of the 
ten questions are presented in a table followed by a discussion of the relative 
effectiveness of the model. The cases of Theodore Kaczynski, known as the 
“Unabomber;” Eric Rudolph; and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad formerly 
known as Carlos Bledsoe have been selected because they are domestic cases and 
litigation is complete.  
 
Theodore Kaczynski (The Unabomber) 
Theodore Kaczynski, known as the Unabomber, was convicted of mailing sixteen 
package and letter bombs, killing three and injuring twenty-three over eighteen 
years, and was sentenced to life in prison without parole.
34
 When he was younger, 
Kaczynski’s parents encouraged his academic pursuits, culminating in his 
graduation from Harvard University at age twenty.
35
 He obtained his PhD in 
Mathematics from the University of Michigan five years later. After teaching for 
two years at Stanford University, and publishing articles that impressed his 
peers, he quit, ultimately living as a recluse in Montana.
36
  
 
Throughout his life, Kaczynski expressed anger toward his parents, blaming them 
for emotional abuse because they focused on his academic abilities, thus leaving 
him to feel that he was a social cripple.
37
 Kaczynski wrote letters to newspapers, 
magazines, potential targets, and to one victim.
38
 In 1995, his manifesto was 
published by law enforcement with the hope that someone who might have heard 
him would be able to identify the Unabomber. In letters to his parents he blamed 
them for his social woes, while the manifesto and letters to publications and 
public figures spoke of his disdain for advancing technology. Results of a 
psychological assessment completed after his arrest diagnosed Kaczynski with 
paranoid schizophrenia with two significant delusions. They were his beliefs that 
science and technology would destroy nature by turning humans into automatons 
controlled by machines and that his inability to socialize, particularly with 
women, was the result of abuse by his parents.
39
 
 
                                                        
34 Alston Chase, “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber,” The Atlantic Monthly 285:6 (2000), 
available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2000/06/chase.htm; Instituut voor 
Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement (COT), Lone-wolf terrorism. (2007, June 7): 82-83, available at: 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf. 
35 Chase, “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber”; COT, Lone-wolf terrorism, 38. 
36 COT, Lone-wolf terrorism, 38. 
37 Turchie, Terry and Kathleen Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist: The FBI’s War on 
Homegrown Terror, (Palisades, NY: History Publishing Company, 2007), Nook Edition, 199-201. 
38 Chase, “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber.” 
39 Ibid; Sally C. Johnson, “Forensic Evaluation,” United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California (1998): 40-41, available at: 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/media/acrobat/2008-04/37849352.pdf. 
increase/decrease the likelihood of 
the subject attempting to attack a 
target? 
increase/decrease the likelihood of  
the subject attempting to attack a 
target? 
Zierhoffer: Threat Assessment Lone Terrorists
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
55 
 
Kaczynski’s sister-in-law recognized the similarity between the manifesto and 
things she had heard about him. She convinced her husband to talk to 
authorities. In his report, David Kaczynski stated his brother had become more 
disturbed over the years.
40
 David feared his brother would hurt others and that 
compelled him to identify him as a suspect.
41
  
 
Eric Rudolph 
Eric Rudolph was sentenced to multiple life sentences without parole, convicted 
of killing two people and of injuring more than 100 people in four separate 
bombings.
42
 He is known primarily for exploding a pipe bomb at the 1996 
Summer Olympics in Atlanta. As he was growing up, his mother exposed him to 
numerous religions including Christian Identity and introduced him to several 
members of white supremacist groups.
43
 She had also endorsed a fear of the 
United States government.
44
 
 
Rudolph has been described as “disaffected,” a young American who found solace 
in extremism. Early on, Rudolph demonstrated his inability to fit in, spending 
weekends in the woods alone, living a very transient life with his family, adopting 
Christian Identity tenets which includes the belief in the supremacy of the white 
race, and getting kicked out of the Army after only eighteen months.
45
 His mother 
likely influenced his anti-abortion stance. They shared many of the same ideas 
and his mother likely introduced him to much of his ideology.
46
  
 
It appears that Rudolph’s inability to fit in and his desire to matter contributed to 
his bombing campaign.
47
 Rudolph’s inability to conform and his failure to find 
others who believed as he did appear to have motivated him to attack in anger, to 
gain attention through violence that he could not find in other ways.
48
 
 
Carlos Bledsoe/Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad 
                                                        
40 David Johnston and Janny Scott, “Prisoner of Rage: The Tortured Genius of Theodore 
Kaczynski,” The New York Times, May 26, 1996, 12-14, available at:  
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/26/us/prisoner-of-rage-the-tortured-genius-of-theodore-
kaczynski.html?ref=davidkaczynski. 
41 Ibid, 35.  
42 Shaila Dewan, “Olympics Bomber Apologizes and Is Sentenced to Life Terms,” The New York 
Times, August 23, 2005, 15-16, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/23/national/23bomber.html?ref=ericrobertrudolph&_r=0; 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Eric Rudolph Charged in Centennial Olympic Park bombing,” 
USDOJ.gov, October 14, 1998, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/1998/October/477crm.htm. 
43Vollers, Maryanne, Lone Wolf: Eric Rudolph: Murder, Myth, and the Pursuit of an American 
Outlaw, (New York: HarperCollins eBooks, 2006): 102-104. 
44 Nathan Springer, “Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists 
in our Midst,” (Master Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 52, available at: 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=29620. 
45 Michael Ross, “Eric Rudolph’s Rage was a Long Time Brewin,’” MSNBC.com, April 13, 2005, 
available at:  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7398701/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/eric-
rudolphs-rage-was-long-time-brewing/. 
46 Springer, Identifying the Markers, 61. 
47 Turchie and Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, 260, 270. 
48 Vollers, Lone Wolf, 249. 
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Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, born Carlos Bledsoe, was arrested on June 1, 
2009 after shooting two soldiers outside of the Little Rock Recruiting Station.
49
 
He was convicted after pleading guilty to capital murder, attempted capital 
murder, and ten weapons related charges. He was sentenced to life in prison 
without parole for the murder plus eleven life sentences plus 150 years for the 
remaining charges.
50
  
 
Bledsoe was raised in Memphis by parents who owned a tour business. Neighbors 
described him as a nice young man.
51
 He graduated high school and attended 
Tennessee State University for three semesters before dropping out.
52
 For many 
years he had been in sporadic trouble with the law and was using alcohol and 
marijuana to excess.
53
 While in college, he turned to religion to straighten out his 
life. Bledsoe felt welcomed by Muslims and studied in Nashville before changing 
his name and soon thereafter travelling to Yemen, supposedly to teach English.
54
 
Muhammad was arrested and jailed in Yemen possessing false Somali 
identification papers.
55
  
 
Muhammad had stated many times, after returning from Yemen, that he was 
angry at what the United States military had done to Muslims in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and his parents were aware of his burning anger.
56
 After his arrest, 
he made clear that he was seeking revenge for the American killing of Muslims. 
He also was angry about what Jewish groups had done in Palestine.
57
 His parents 
were aware that he had been radicalized while in Yemen and that he had returned 
home with anti-American views and attempted to westernize him by directly 
involving him in the family tourism business.
58
 
 
Responses to the 10 Questions 
Table 2 presents abbreviated responses to the questions from Table 1 for each of 
the three cases. Most of the questions presented some information that could be 
                                                        
49 Mike Durham, “Arrest Affidavit/Disposition Report,” Arkansas Crime Information Center (June 
2, 2009): 4, available at: http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/989.pdf. 
50 Jeannie Nuss, “Abdulhakim Muhammad Trial: Shooter in Arkansas Soldier Killing Sentenced to 
Life,” The Huffington Post, July 25, 20011, 1, available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/25/abdulhakim-muhammad-trial_n_909106.html. 
51 NEFA Foundation, “The Little Rock, Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” The NEFA 
Foundation, Report #18, 2009, available at: 
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.
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52 Ibid. 
53 Kristina Goetz, “Muslim Who Shot Soldier in Arkansas Says He Wanted to Cause More Death,” 
Commercial Appeal, November 13, 2010, available at: 
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/nov/13/muslim-who-shot-solider-arkansas-says-he-
wanted-ca/, under section 2. 
54 NEFA Foundation, “The Little Rock, Arkansas”; James Dao, “A Muslin Son, a Murder Trial and 
Many Questions,” The New York Times, February 16, 2010, 25, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html?pagewanted=1. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Arkansas Crime Information Center, Arrest affidavit/Disposition report, 4; NEFA Foundation, 
“The Little Rock, Arkansas.” 
57 The Investigative Project on Terrorism, “The Making of an American Jihadist: Abdulhakim 
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alerting to law enforcement professionals. Family and peers might also utilize 
these questions as a foundation for a report to law enforcement officials. 
 
Table 2: Abbreviated responses for each case to the 10 terrorism 
questions  
 
Theodore 
Kaczynski 
Eric Rudolph 
Abdulhakim 
Mujahid 
Muhammad 
1 
Motivation 
• Anti-technology 
• Anti-industry 
• Revenge 
• Desire to be 
recognized; to 
matter 
• Anti-abortion 
• Inability to fit 
in 
• Desire to 
matter 
• Angry at U.S. for 
killing Muslims 
• Radicalization 
2 
Communication 
• Anonymous 
letters 
• Expressed 
anger to family 
• Maintained 
journals 
• Told 
acquaintance he 
wanted to build 
a bomb 
• Maintained 
journals 
• Limited contact 
with family 
• No 
communication 
of intent with 
family 
 
 
 
 
3 
Interest in 
Terrorism 
• Hid behind 
“FC;” Freedom 
Club 
• Ideology 
against 
technology 
• Influence: The 
Secret Agent by 
Joseph Conrad 
• Fringes of 
extremist 
groups 
• Hid behind 
“Army of God” 
• Conversion to 
Islam 
• Went to Yemen 
• Was arrested 
with paperwork 
for Somalia 
• Imprisoned in 
Yemen 
4 
Attack-related 
Behaviors 
• Threat to “get 
even” in 1978 
• Science 
experiments in 
high school 
• Purchased 
materials at 
Wal-Mart 
• Gave up 
connections to 
family and 
friends 
• Had weapons; 
learned skills in 
Army 
• Fights and gang 
membership in 
high school 
• Purchased 
weapons 
• Two 
unsuccessful 
attempts before 
shooting 
5 
Mental Illness 
• Paranoid 
Schizophrenia 
with delusions 
• Diagnosis post 
arrest 
• History of 
seeking 
counseling; only 
single visits or 
• No diagnosis 
• No 
psychological 
assessment 
• No diagnosis 
• Psychological 
assessment post 
arrest 
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letters 
6 
Organization 
• PhD by age 23 
• Professor at 
Berkeley 
• Built his own 
cabin 
• Lived frugally 
• Completed 
Basic Training 
and Air Assault 
• Learned 
survival and 
infantry skills 
in Army 
• Attended college 
successfully for 3 
semesters 
• History of 
alcohol and drug 
use 
• Not a good 
planner: 2 failed 
attempts 
7 
Loss 
• Social outcast 
all his life 
• Loss of a 
peaceful world 
due to 
technology 
• Few 
relationships 
with women 
• Never fit in 
• Gave up social 
connections 
prior to 
bombing 
campaign 
• Lost his position 
among his 
Muslim world 
upon deportation 
to the U.S.  
8 
Corroboration 
• Always a loner 
• Loving letters 
versus angry 
letters to home 
• People heard 
his rants for 
years 
• Anti-gay, blacks 
& abortion 
• Spent much 
time alone 
• Conflict 
between 
wanting to be 
part of a group 
and inability to 
do so 
• Angry, but he 
was willing to 
move to Little 
Rock to run the 
family business 
• His attitude 
seemed to turn 
positive 
9 
Concern of 
Others 
• Yes: sister-in-
law 
• Family knew of 
anger 
• No, though one 
woman heard 
threat at least 5 
years before 1st 
bomb 
• Community 
shared similar 
views  
• Yes, the family 
• FBI questioned 
and released 
him-no 
investigation  
• His father gave 
him a job in 
Little Rock to de-
radicalize him 
 
10 
Prevention 
• Ability to 
sustain 
personal 
connections 
• Finding 
acceptance 
• Ability to 
sustain 
personal 
connections 
• Mother who 
taught socially 
• Had FBI opened 
a full 
investigation  
• Had his father 
not moved him 
to Little Rock  
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appropriate 
values 
 
Discussion  
The threat assessment model developed by Borum et al. to evaluate the 
assessment of risk for targeted violence, and presented in Table 1, appears to 
focus on relevant patterns of thinking and behaviors when applied to the 
potential lone terrorist. Utilizing these three cases, most of the terrorism 
questions provided answers, summarized in Table 2, which might have caused 
concern from either acquaintances or law enforcement agents had these 
questions been available in a structured format. Attention to patterns of 
behaviors and thoughts may have prevented these terrorist attacks or, in the 
cases of Kaczynski and Rudolph, might have prevented subsequent attacks. 
However, their utility is seemingly more relevant with today’s technology and 
cultural awareness of terrorism than they may have been in the 1980s and 1990s 
when Kaczynski and Rudolph were conducting attacks. 
 
Borum et al. presented three principles upon which an assessment of threat 
should be based. The first principle is that targeted violence involves a process of 
thinking and planning that is deliberate and not impulsive, often consuming the 
planner’s life. Several questions in the assessment deal with the planning an 
individual must do in order to carry out an attack. The second principle involves 
the interaction among the potential attacker, a past emotional event, a current 
situation and a target. The third principle is to understand the behaviors of the 
individual that are likely to lead up to an attack.
59
 Using hindsight, these three 
principles are known in each of the three cases presented. These assessment 
principles focus attention on behaviors that are likely to be a part of the attack 
process. Based on these cases, these principles appear to be as relevant for 
detecting the lone terrorist as they are for detecting the perpetrator of targeted 
violence. Being physically or emotionally close to someone would expose one to 
the behaviors of that person. Publicizing these principles and questions may lead 
concerned citizens to contact authorities who may open an investigation and 
prevent an attack.  
 
There is significant information known about Kaczynski to provide positive 
responses to all ten questions. Rudolph and Muhammad are negative for mental 
illness and Muhammad is not known to have communicated any information 
about a plan to anyone who might have cooperated with law enforcement. 
Question number seven has positive results for all three terrorists. Their histories 
are expanded here to draw attention to their losses.  Kaczynski was a social 
cripple who never fit in. He hated the technological society in which he felt he 
could not live and identified himself with a cause that would not reject him: FC, 
or Freedom Club, his own anarchist group of which he was the only member.
60
 
Rudolph was unsuccessful in his bid to join the Army’s Special Forces but, by 
becoming the Army of God, could vent his anger against abortion and find 
acceptance.
61
 Muhammad fell in with a bad crowd in high school and then in 
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college, and sought comfort in religion. Rejecting the Baptist church in which he 
had grown up, he learned about Islam and found acceptance in a group that 
seemingly encouraged him to attack Americans to further their cause.
62
  Each had 
experienced loss throughout their lives and expressed anger over their perceived 
injustices.  
 
The seventh question attempts to identify a recent loss. In all three of these cases 
the losses were not recent, but were persistent. The end of a romantic 
relationship or the death of a loved one might spark an individual to retaliate out 
of hurt or anger. Perhaps with terrorism, loss might be more broadly defined, as 
these three cases seem to suggest. Each of these men fought internally with their 
inability to find their place in society. Borum et al. appear to correctly identify a 
sense of loss as a risk factor for terrorism, but loss as a trigger might be different 
for terrorism than for targeted violence. This factor warrants further research. 
Perhaps the question should address a festering reaction to a loss rather than a 
recent loss that might be more of a trigger for violence against a specific target 
than a trigger for terrorism.  
 
All questions in this approach produced positive responses for one or more of 
these cases. However, more is known about these cases now than may be 
available for potential lone terrorists who have not yet attacked. In the same 
manner that the seventh question might be refined, further research is 
recommended to consider language that more specifically defines the behaviors 
and thinking relevant to the lone terrorist.  
 
Law enforcement agencies may benefit from having these questions; they may 
have been helpful in the assessment of risk posed by Muhammad. The FBI 
questioned Muhammad before he went to Yemen, while he was imprisoned there, 
and then upon his return to Memphis. Muhammad’s father believes his son 
attended Jihadi training in Yemen and information about that investigation is not 
available to the public.
63
 It has been hypothesized that had criminal activity been 
detected the FBI may have broadened the investigation, which might have led 
agents to observe Muhammad in the early stages of the attack cycle.
64
 The FBI 
may have assessed Muhammad for criminal behavior but may not have identified 
his behavioral changes over time as indicators of a potential terrorist theat. If 
provided a model for assessing the risk of lone terrorism, law enforcement may 
examine behaviors more effectively and counter the terrorist threat.  
 
The ability for people to assist law enforcement in identifying potential threat is 
dependent upon relationships between the potential terrorist and those who 
might be able to detect the potential risk. Kaczynski and Rudolph had inadequate 
relationships for most of their lives and Bledsoe/Muhammad turned away from 
his family to find acceptance in an unfamiliar culture. In these terrorist cases, the 
targets were strangers who represented a cause against which each terrorist 
professed his belief. Research suggests lone terrorists tend to be intelligent 
individuals who look internally for the authority needed for taking action rather 
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than relying on others, and most were unsuccessful in their social lives.
65
 In spite 
of the lack of deep connection, there were people in the lives of each of these 
terrorists who could report on changes in behavior and bring their concerns to 
authority, as happened in the case of Kaczynski. 
 
Empirical research identifies numerous individual risk factors for other crime 
including age, gender, marital status, social class, major mental illness, prior 
crime, and personality.
66
 The FBI was unsuccessful in identifying the Unabomber 
when it created a database utilizing these factors. The database included all 
individuals known to have lived in areas within which Kaczynski operated. 
Kaczynski was eliminated as a suspect because he was much older than the age 
bracket the FBI expected would also apply to terrorism.
67
 Individual risk factors 
are unlikely to contribute to the assessment of threat in the way these questions 
about behaviors may. 
 
One difficulty with this assessment model appears to be the lack of significant 
relationships between a potential lone terrorist and others who could potentially 
identify behaviors. Rudolph and Kaczynski were isolated, enabling them to 
develop and carry out plans without detection. The person most likely to engage 
in lone terrorism is an isolated individual and because of that, planning of the 
attack may go undetected. After an attack when information is available to the 
public, acquaintances and estranged family may recognize patterns of behavior 
consistent with lone terrorists. In cases where the threat assessment model may 
not identify behaviors prior to an initial attack, the model may be effective in 
preventing subsequent attacks, at a much earlier stage than when Kaczynski’s 
sister-in-law became suspicious.  
 
Since 9/11, Americans may have a greater awareness of terrorism. Bystanders 
have been encouraged by the Department of Homeland Security to report 
suspicious packages. An educational campaign aimed at preventing an 
acquaintance from engaging in terrorism may be effective. David Kaczynski’s wife 
saw a resemblance between the ideas of her brother-in-law and a terrorist she 
read about while in France, causing her to persuade her husband to contact the 
authorities after the Unabomber’s manifesto was published. Although difficult, 
Kaczynski’s brother hoped to prevent more death and destruction.
68
  
 
Conclusion 
The questions posed by Borum et al. in their threat assessment model, when 
modified slightly to reflect behaviors consistent with terrorism, expand efforts to 
identify a lone terrorist by focusing on thoughts and behaviors that may be 
indicative of terrorist activity. The model moves away from simply looking at 
demographics or characteristics of the potential terrorist and focuses on 
behaviors that could indicate the movement of the person toward achieving a 
goal. This analysis of the threat assessment model developed by Borum et al. 
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provides a foundation for further research for a model that would prevent lone 
offender terrorism.  
 
Law enforcement is limited in its ability to conduct investigations and identify 
every criminal or terrorist in the community.  Citizens, law enforcement agents, 
and investigators need a tool that might identify the lone terrorist, prospectively 
rather than reactively. Identifying a lone terrorist before an attack permits law 
enforcement to focus resources on a viable threat.   
 
Further research is recommended to determine the significance of questions on 
the list. Not every individual wanting to matter and wanting to fit in turns to 
terrorism. By the same token, lone terrorists may not desire to matter or to fit in. 
The model provides questions that identify thoughts and patterns of behavior 
that could identify a potential terrorist. Are some questions more important than 
others in determining the point when one turns from ideas to actions? Are there a 
minimum number of questions that might suggest that move? Monahan, a 
psychologist who wrote of the challenges to assessing the risk of terrorism, 
discussed the concept of structuring a risk assessment. He addressed not only the 
need to identify the risk factors related to terrorism, but he questioned the 
possibility of measuring or “scoring” those factors to determine their ultimate 
value in the assessment process.
69
 It is recommended the model presented in this 
study be further studied, applying questions posed by Monahan’s research. It is 
recommended further research apply this model focusing on more current cases, 
perhaps having been influenced differently from older trends in terrorism. 
 
This tool appears to provide a solid foundation for a risk assessment model that 
may help to identify lone terrorists before and after an attack. The behaviors 
described in the questions of this tool appear to be as relevant in the 
identification of a potential lone terrorist as they are for the perpetrator of 
targeted violence. The strength of this model lies in its focus on behaviors rather 
than demographic data. The weakness of the model is that the observations of 
behavior require proximity to the perpetrator. Although we may not yet have an 
effective tool with which to predict the threat of risk for the potential lone 
terrorist, the threat assessment model developed by Borum et al. to evaluate the 
risk of targeted violence, with the benefit of further research, can be refined to 
more specifically address the threat of the lone terrorist.70  
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